The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States

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CENTER ON ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD
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Synopsis

The leadership of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within. The Brotherhood leadership has also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the early 1960s, the Brotherhood has constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or “front” organizations. The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history, both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older form of thought inside the Brotherhood. An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents, however, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.

BACKGROUND

Goals of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood

A 1991 document written by U.S. MB leader Mohammed Akram (a.k.a. Mohammed Adlouni) explains the goal of the Brotherhood in America, which he identifies as “settlement:”

The general strategic goal of the Brotherhood in America which was approved by the Shura [Leadership] Council and the Organizational Conference for 1987 is “enablement of Islam in North America, meaning: establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base; aims at unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts; presents Islam as a civilization alternative; and supports the global Islamic state, wherever it is.” ... The priority that is approved by the Shura Council for the work of the Brotherhood in its current and former session is “Settlement.”

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The document goes on to explain that “settlement” is a form of jihad aimed at destroying Western civilization from within and allowing for the victory of Islam over other religions:

The process of settlement is a “Civilization-Jihadist process” with all that the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the Mujahidin be equal.2

In another part of the document titled “The Process of Settlement,” the author explains that for the Brotherhood’s goals to be accomplished, it is necessary to have a strong organizational base:

In order for Islam and its Movement to become “a part of the homeland” in which it lives, “stable” in its land, “rooted” in the spirits and minds of its people, “enabled” in the life of its society, [with] firmly established “organizations” on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain “the keys” and the tools of this process in carrying out this grand mission as a “Civilization-Jihadist” responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and—on top of them—the Muslim Brotherhood in this country...."3

The MB has been establishing its organizational base in the U.S for over forty-five years. An examination of relevant documents, some of which became available only recently, makes it possible for the first time to construct a coherent timeline of how the U.S. Brotherhood has created a wide range of covert and public organizations designed to achieve its purposes. This report is based on three sets of documents: first, internal U.S. MB documents discovered in the home of one of its leaders and introduced as evidence in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) trial on terrorism financing;5 second, a Chicago Tribune investigation based in part on statements from a former U.S. MB leader;6 and finally, various public documents, including corporate registrations, media reports, and other open-source material.

These documents reveal that, throughout its history, the U.S. MB has been comprised of a covert infrastructure upon which was built a series of public organizations, sometimes referred to by the Brotherhood as “fronts.”
The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

To fully understand the organizational development of the U.S. MB, it is first necessary to review some of the early history of the Brotherhood in Europe, as individuals that played important roles in this history went on to take part later in the development of the U.S. Brotherhood. A Wall Street Journal report has described the life of Said Ramadan, the son-in-law of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hassan al-Banna), who along with many other Muslim Brothers fled Egypt following the attempted assassination of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. In 1958, after stops in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Pakistan, Ramadan settled in Germany and Geneva and in 1960 took control of a mosque-construction commission in Munich that was building a new mosque in that city. Another important individual that was part of the mosque-construction commission was Ghaleb Ali Himmat:

A Syrian, he went to Munich in the 1950s to study but ended up amassing wealth as a merchant.... Contemporaries and archival records indicate that Himmat was a driving force behind the mosque. In 1958 ... he led the movement to invite Said Ramadan to Munich. Documents show that the two worked closely together. They went on fund-raising trips abroad, and Himmat stood in for Ramadan when the older man was back in Geneva.8

In 1962, the commission became the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland (IGD e.V.), serving as the nucleus of the MB in Germany.9 10 Yusuf Mustafa Nada—a Muslim Brother living in Austria—eventually became associated with Himmat:

Nada joined the MB in the 1940s and was arrested as a 23-year-old student in the giant 1954 sweep that followed the failed assassination attempt of Nasser. He was released and worked in his family dairy business. In 1960 he obtained an exit visa and went to Austria to study cheese-making technology, which he hoped to bring back to Egypt. He saw a market opening in Egypt for Emmentaler and went to Graz to study its manufacture.

Though not the most gripping start to the career of a future Islamic activist charged with being a terrorist financier, this period demonstrated Nada’s doggedness. When his cheese plans failed, he started dealing with Tripoli, became close to the court and got a concession exporting building materials from Austria. Like most of Nada’s successful ventures, it was a quasi-monopoly, one that required good contacts but little real business savvy. In the mid-1960s he met Himmat—when, he
said, he went to Munich from Graz to participate in a Ramadan fast-breaking dinner—and introduced Himmat to the Libyan court, which promised to fund the mosque.\textsuperscript{11}

Italian intelligence documents confirm that Nada was living in Graz from 1960 to 1964, and in Tunisia and Vienna from 1964 to 1969.\textsuperscript{12}

Also living in Graz and Vienna—likely at the same time as Nada—was Dr. Ahmed Elkadi. The \textit{Chicago Tribune} reports that Elkadi’s father-in-law was an early Brotherhood leader in Egypt:

Iman Elkadi’s (Ahmed’s wife) father, Mahmoud Abu-Saud, was particularly involved in the Brotherhood’s beginnings in Egypt and remains well-known in the Arab world. An accomplished economist, he is widely regarded as a pioneer in Islamic banking, which requires that interest not be charged for loans. He also was jailed repeatedly for his Brotherhood activities. “My grandfather would tell me that if my dad didn’t come home for dinner, he would send someone to check the jails,” Iman Elkadi recalls. The Elkadi and Abu-Saud families were linked in marriage in 1963 after Ahmed Elkadi, then a 22-year-old preparing to go into the Egyptian military, ran into his future father-in-law at a mutual friend’s office. When the young Elkadi learned that Abu-Saud had an unmarried daughter, he inquired about her. The father, familiar with the young man’s family and its devotion to the Brotherhood, invited him to their home. Soon after, the families arranged for Ahmed and Iman to marry ... Soon afterward, Egyptian intelligence officials called the couple in for questioning. Iman Elkadi says, “They asked my husband, ‘ Couldn’t you find anybody else to marry except Mahmoud Abu-Saud’s daughter?’”\textsuperscript{13}

The \textit{Chicago Tribune} explains that Elkadi and his wife were married in Egypt in 1963, after which he obtained various medical degrees in Graz and Vienna before emigrating to the U.S. in 1967.\textsuperscript{14, 15} Given that Nada and Abu-Saud were both Egyptian MB refugees, and that Elkadi was living in both Graz and Vienna at the same time, it is highly likely that Nada and Elkadi were acquainted with one another in Graz.\textsuperscript{16}
THE BEGINNINGS
(1962-1970)

A speech given in the early 1980’s by Zeid al-Noman, an MB leader, explains how the Brotherhood organization coalesced in the U.S. in the early 1960s. al-Noman describes the first phase as a “gathering or grouping:”17

... the Movement was founded here with the founding of the general Islamic activism or it might have preceded it by a little bit. At first, it was a gathering or a grouping for Islam activists without an organizational affiliation with the Movement. So, the first generation of the Muslim Ikhwans in north America composed of a team which included he who was an Ikhwan in his country or he who was a member of The Worshipers of the Merciful Group or he who doesn’t have a direction but who is active in Islamic activism. This was the first point or group which gave or planted the Muslim Brotherhood seed in America.18

Al-Noman describes the second phase of Brotherhood development as regional gatherings headed by a “Coordination Council:”

After that, the Movement went through different organizational formats. One of the first organizational formats tried here were the regional gatherings as each movement had ..., had its gathering with a leadership and the collection of these leadership formed the Group’s leadership or what is called the Coordination Council. They were meeting and the resolutions of that Council were non-binding for its members. Of course, there were some countries ..., there were some countries which did not have a large gathering in North America, we can call them .... [UI] countries, individuals of this country would associate with the nearest movement to them. So, for instance, an Iraqi might have joined Jordan’s Ikhwans and, for instance, a Libyan might associate with Egypt’s Ikhwans and so forth.

Finally, al-Noman says that a unified leadership emerged, operating under the name of “The Muslim Brotherhood:”

Following this stage, a new organizational format started to evolve which is the
unified Movement. These ..., these groups of Ikhwans started to gather under one leadership. During this stage, the name of this gathering was not important but the affiliation with the Ikhwan's name was an affiliation due to the size of thought of this Movement and ...er, or books and writings of this Movement which were available in the field. This was the reason for which the name “The Muslim Brotherhood” was adopted as a basis for this work. I mean, to the point that, at some point, there was an attempt to change the name of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement to The Islamic Movement and making it affiliated with a dissenting group in Iraq called the Islamic Movement. All of that, Ikhwans, was at the beginning of work when the Ikhwans who came to America, may God reward them all good, were seeking methods for activism. This was probably in mid '60s ...er, or even ...., I mean, mid ’60s, long time ago.19

This “new organizational format” of the U.S. MB may have been related to the “The Cultural Society,” an organization that was created in 1962 to protect the identity of Muslim Brothers who had come to the U.S. The Chicago Tribune investigation detailed the formation of the Society:

A U.S. chapter of the Brotherhood … was formed in the early 1960s after hundreds of young Muslims came to the U.S. to study, particularly at large Midwestern universities such as Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. Some belonged to the Brotherhood in their homelands and wanted to spread its ideology here. But to protect themselves and their relatives back home from possible persecution, they publicly called themselves “The Cultural Society” and not “The Brotherhood.”20

There is no available information about where the Cultural Society was first established or the identity of its early leaders.21 However, the Tribune investigation reported that the Cultural Society went on to help establish the Muslim Students Association (MSA) in 1963, the first in a series of the Brotherhood’s public or “front” organizations. A U.S. Brotherhood document confirms that MSA was founded by the Brotherhood giving a slightly earlier date:

In 1962, the Muslim Students Union was founded by a group of the first Ikhwans in North America and the meetings of the Ikhwan became conferences and Student Union camps.22

One of the MSA founders acknowledges the 1962 founding of the organization, providing some additional detail: 23

The MSA of the U.S. and Canada was officially formed at the University of Illinois
in Urbana-Champaign on January 1, 1962. We first met in Urbana on December 25th, 1961, when some MSA students were visiting us from Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Then we met again on the first day of January 1962 to plan a strategy for the bylaws and how to organize all the students in America. There were about eight people from four different states. In April of the same year, we had our first annual convention in Urbana where fifteen people attended. The second convention was in Urbana as well, and fifty people attended. And the third was in Carbondale, Illinois where we had two hundred people attend…. At that time, we were [all] known as “Muslims” … there was no difference between Arabs and non-Arabs, Shia and Sunni. People at the time did not know much about Islam. We were invited by non-Muslims to give lectures about Islam. Even the university’s foreign student advisor used to help and guide us, and gave us a plaque of achievement. MSA was the best student group on campus; we used to pray daily on campus and had a series of lectures to non-Muslims on Friday evenings.24

In 1995, global MB leader Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi further confirmed the connections between MSA and the Brotherhood, and said that the goal of the organization was to “conquer” the U.S. through *dawa* (Islamic proselytizing):

In a 1995 speech to an Islamic conference in Ohio, a top Brotherhood official, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, said victory will come through *dawa*: “Conquest through *dawa*, that is what we hope for,” said al-Qaradawi, an influential Qatari imam who pens some of the religious edicts justifying Hamas suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. “We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not through the sword but through *dawa*,” said the imam, who has condemned the 9/11 attacks but is now barred from the United States. In his speech, al-Qaradawi said the *dawa* would work through Islamic groups set up by Brotherhood supporters in [the U.S.]. He praised supporters who were jailed by Arab governments in the 1950s and then came to the United States to “fight the seculars and the Westernized” by founding this country’s leading Islamic groups. He named the MSA [as one such group].25

It is likely that the MSA served as an important recruiting tool for the U.S. MB. The *Chicago Tribune* investigation details how the Cultural Society’s recruitment process involved careful surveillance of Islamic facilities and organizations:

Not anyone could join the Brotherhood. The group had a carefully detailed strategy on how to find and evaluate potential members, according to a Brotherhood instructional booklet for recruiters. Leaders would scout mosques, Islamic classes,
and Muslim organizations for those with orthodox religious beliefs consistent with Brotherhood views…. The leaders then would invite them to join a small prayer group, or usra (family or prayer group). The prayer groups were a defining feature of the Brotherhood…. But leaders initially would not reveal the purpose of the prayer groups, and recruits were asked not to tell anyone about the meetings. If recruits asked about a particular meeting to which they were not invited, they should respond, “Make it a habit not to meddle in that which does not concern you.” Leaders were told that during prayer meetings they should focus on fundamentals, including “the primary goal of the Brotherhood: setting up the rule of God upon the Earth.” After assessing the recruits’ “commitment, loyalty, and obedience” to Brotherhood ideals, the leaders would invite suitable candidates to join. New members, according to the booklet, would be told that they now were part of the worldwide Brotherhood and that membership “is not a personal honor but a charge to sacrifice all that one has for the sake of raising the banner of Islam.”

Al-Noman describes Brotherhood recruitment in a similar manner, also making reference to usras (prayer groups), and suggests that the MSA was the main organization for recruiting into the U.S. MB:

As a recruitment in the ranks of this movement, it’s main conditions was that a brother must be active in the general activism in the MSA, a person who attends its general conferences or participating in its executive committees, whether local or central, and this was the Movements’ condition in the sixties. We can then sum up the condition of the movement in the 60s by saying that commitment to the movement was a sentimental commitment, a grouping one and general activism was the basis for that commitment. Also in the beginning, there were regional gatherings which turned into a unified movement without an intellectual or organizational scale. And we said that recruitment used to take place in the following format, attending the MSA conferences, and choosing active Arab elements and approaching them to join the Ikhwans. As for the Ikhwan who came from their countries, they probably joined the movement specifically if there were large numbers of Ikhwan movement who preceded them to America. Then, joining movement would be automatic; he would notify that he has arrived and after that he would join in the nearest opportunity. Most of the Usras then were then individual Usras. I mean, sometimes an Ursa would be made up of three people and the distance between two of them is maybe 100 or 150 miles. They would meet once a month or once every six weeks.
The document also notes that the concurrent conferences of the two organizational structures facilitated this recruitment from MSA into the Brotherhood:

The Ikhwan’s conferences used to be held at the same time as the MSA conferences. They would either precede it with one day or come a day after them.28

Three Iraqis

THREE INDIVIDUALS—Ahmad al-Haj Totonji, Dr. Jamal al-Din Barzinji, and Dr. Hisham Yahya al-Talib—played key roles in the founding and development of MSA. All were born in the Kurdish, northern part of Iraq, and may have met there or possibly later in Britain, where all three received their undergraduate education in engineering.29 30 31

An FBI memo has identified Barzinji and al-Talib as members of the Muslim Brotherhood prior to establishing a residence in the U.S.”32 The Washington Post adds that [Barzinji] fled Iraq in 1969 when the Ba’athist regime started executing fellow Islamists.33 34

After completion of their studies in Britain, the three came to the United States, ostensibly for graduate study but also to continue organizing Muslim youth activities. An MSA history identifies Totonji, among others, as one of the founders of MSA:

It was in January 1963 that some of the most respected personalities in the Islamic movement came together at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and formed the MSA of the U.S. and Canada. Over seventy people from across the country, including Muslim Brothers Totonji, Ahmad Sakr,35 Mahdi Bhadori, Ilyas Ba-Yunus—then all students—met in what would be the first of a number of historic gatherings to discuss the state of Muslims in North America.36

A December 1996 letter written by Totonji indicates that he had become the MSA Chairman.37 Another history of the MSA adds Barzinji to the list of MSA leaders:

The MSA ... started with just a little more than a dozen students.... The earlier conventions in the sixties attracted hardly a hundred participants. But the momentum provided by the likes of Sakr, Totonji, Barzinji, and others too numerous to mention, gradually caught on, membership increased, chapters multiplied, and [this] brought us to the point where we are today.38

The Washington Post article confirms that Barzinji was an important MSA leader and implies that he was a member of the MB:
An engineering student and top MSA leader, [Barzinji] joined MSA associates in 1971 to host the top leaders of the Egyptian Brotherhood—just released from sixteen years in prison—for two weeks of meetings in Indiana. He and other then-MSA leaders helped persuade the Egyptian Brothers to try participating in Egyptian elections as an alternative to underground struggle.... “It was one of our main contributions to the Ikhwan movement worldwide,” he said.39

An online biography of Dr. Barzinji adds that he was MSA President in 1972.40 Finally, a book written by al-Talib suggests that he was also one of the important members of the MSA at that time.41

Various documents and media articles indicate that the MSA headquarters was located in Gary, Indiana, until 1975, where it was associated with the Masjid al-Amin Mosque.
FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. INFRASTRUCTURE
(1970-1975)

Following the founding of MSA, the MB began to lay the groundwork for the development of a more extensive organizational infrastructure in the U.S. Al-Noman calls this the “period of codification” which lasted until 1975:

…in the beginning of the 70’s a new era started. We can call it the stage of codification. The people started to …, they put together the first bylaws of theirs and they started after that to…. And, in doing this thing, there started to be an emphasis on the Ikhwan’s formula for this Movement. Prior to this stage, young elements came to America, specially Gulf elements or Saudi elements which joined the ranks of the Movement regularly. This was the first true tremor for the Ikhwan’s activism here in America as these brothers started to demand clearer Ikhwan formulas, clearer commitment and means or ones with a specific and not a general nature and that there are conditions to accept one into the ranks of this Dawa’a and to made work secret….etc.42

Another internal Brotherhood document says that the Brotherhood began to move out from the confines of the MSA, but that they nevertheless maintained a close relationship.43

Al-Noman mentions that MSA and Brotherhood meetings became separate during this time. It is also worth noting that al-Noman mentions a U.S. Brotherhood Shura Council for the first time, as well as remarking on the participation of Pakistani Islamists in the U.S. MB:

…in the past the Ikhwans’ conferences used to be held in the same time as the MSA's conferences, at the same time. They would either precede it with one day or come a day after them. After that they became separate from the MSA's conferences and they lasted an entire week. Also, the leadership would be elected during these conferences….Also attending this meeting, or some of those working in the Islamic field—in particularly the brothers in the Beloved Halaqa [study group] which is the Pakistani brothers Movement or the brothers who were members of the Islamic Group in Pakistan and came to America.
New Organizations

During this period, the U.S. MB began to create a series of new organizations, similar to those created by the Brotherhood in Egypt. An internal Brotherhood document identifies the organizations that were created:

At the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies the vocational organizations affiliated with the Students Union—the Muslim Doctors Syndicate, in 1976; the Muslim Social Workers Syndicate, in 1971; and the Muslim Scientist and Engineers Syndicate, in 1974—were formed.44

At the same time, Brotherhood front organizations were created to address similar constituencies.45 Referred to as the “many outgrowths of the MSA,” they were: the Islamic Medical Association (IMA), founded in 1967; the Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE), founded in 1969; and the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), founded in 1972.46

Barzinji was a founding member of both AMSE and AMSS, with many sources reporting that AMSS grew directly out of MSA.47 48 49 The AMSS website explains its founding as follows:

AMSS was founded in 1972 to provide a forum through which Islamic positions on various academic disciplines can be promoted. From the beginning, AMSS has based its activities on the belief that the development of Islamic thought is vital for the prosperity of the Muslim world and for the continuity of the Islamic intellectual heritage.50 51

The first AMSS president (1972-1978, 1980-1982) was former MSA activist Ismail al-Faruqi.52 During the early 1970’s, MSA was also planning for what was described in a local newspaper article as “the first Islamic university in the U.S.,” to be funded from unidentified sources in the Middle East (possibly Libya):

About one thousand Muslims from more than ninety campuses across the nation are meeting at Michigan State University for a weekend of prayer and discussions on the Islamic role in North America. One topic for the fast-growing MSA will be making plans for the first Islamic university in the United States. The school, if built, will be near Chicago. Money from oil-producing Muslim nations of the Middle East is to be used for support, said Ahmad Totonji of Libya, one of the former presidents of the association and a scheduled speaker.53
It is possible that this process resulted in the creation of the American Islamic College in Chicago, at one time headed by MSA founder Ahmed Sakr.\textsuperscript{54}

**North American Islamic Trust**

A webpage of a current U.S. MB organization identifies another set of organizations that were created during this period:

Other services and outreach organizations soon followed [MSA], such as the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), the Islamic Medical Association (IMA), the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), and the Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA), to name a few.\textsuperscript{55}

NAIT was established as an Indiana corporation on May 23, 1973.\textsuperscript{56,57} The address was listed at the MSA-associated Masjid al-Amin Mosque in Gary, Indiana with Al-Talib as the resident agent for the corporation. The original NAIT board of directors included Barzinji, Sakr, Moinuddin Siddiqui, and Ahmed Osman\textsuperscript{58} and another individual, Mohammed M. Shamma, was listed as an incorporator along with al-Talib.\textsuperscript{59,60}

According to the incorporation documents, the purpose of NAIT was to “serve the best interests of Islam and the Muslim Student’s Association of the United States and Canada” by establishing a non-profit, tax-exempt corporation to hold “investment property.” Four such properties were initially subsumed under this trust with a total declared value of $340,000. Those properties were: Masjid al-Amin Mosque; the MSA Ann Arbor Book Service, in Michigan; International Graphics Printing Service, in Takoma Park, Maryland; and Islamic Book Service, in Cincinnati.

NAIT played an important role in the transition of the U.S. Brotherhood from a student-based organization to one based in the larger U.S. society. Al-Noman discusses the inherent difficulties in creating stable organizational structures (given the transitory lifestyle of students), and then goes on to explain that the problem was addressed through the creation of off-campus facilities:

This change came in stages ..., we can..., it came in forms which we can feel through the reality of general work. The first change was moving the Ikhwans from working at the branches of the MSA and the [Arab Youth Muslim] Association as branches whose activities are based on universities where they go a university to hold their activity, to what is called at that time “The Muslim House.” The Muslim House was based on them purchasing a house near the university with Ikhwans living in a part of it and the rest of it becomes a mosque and it would also be a nucleus for the activity. This was the first move the Ikhwans did. After that, the other
move came where this Muslim House was not a goal by itself or it was no longer able to satisfy work as they started to move to somewhere else which are the Islamic centers. We notice that during the past two or three years that many of the students’ gathering started to establish Islamic centers. This was also another healthy move for settling the Dawa’a as the presence of an Islamic center means the presence of residents, means the existence of contacts between students and the residents, means recruitment of the residents and winning them to the ranks of the Dawa’a, means forming permanent foundations in these cities. Then, what we have now or what we feel now is that there a bigger and bigger acceptance than the Ikhwans’ base for this change and we ask God the Almighty to help us so that we can finish this mission which is the settlement of Dawa’a and that, by that, we would have permanent foundations in America which can benefit Islamic work generally speaking and may God reward you all good.61

An advisor to one of the MSA chapters explains the role that NAIT funding from overseas played in this expansion of the U.S. MB to off-campus locations;62

With its ability to raise funds, especially from overseas, MSA began establishing business and professional organizations useful in establishing off-campus institutions. NAIT became instrumental in establishing masajid (student houses), Islamic centers, full-time schools, and publications (under American Trust Publications, International Graphics Press, and Islamic Book Service).63

The Chicago Tribune investigation details an example of NAIT’S activities, describing how it played an important role in the takeover of a Chicago-area mosque by the U.S. MB as the latter seized control from the mosque’s original, moderate leaders.64 According to the Tribune report, the mosque’s original leader and members were uneducated Palestinian immigrants who purchased land in the Chicago suburb of Bridgeview. By 1978, a new wave of more “political and educated” immigrants had arrived in Chicago and promised to help solicit funds for the construction of the mosque. These individuals were elected to the mosque foundation’s board of directors and helped to raise $1.2 million from the Saudi and U.A.E. governments, as well as from Kuwaiti donors.

The new leadership replaced the mosque leader with Ahmad Zaki Hammad, described as “a conservative Islamic scholar from Egypt,” and identified later in this report as a leader of the U.S. Brotherhood. The newly appointed assistant prayer leader was identified as a Palestinian from Jordan who belonged to the MB. The mosque leaders were described as “adherents of a strict interpretation of Islam,” who instructed women to cover their hair, wear looser clothing, and to stop smoking. The mosque’s older faction fought the leadership’s plans to deed the mosque to NAIT, alleging, “the essence of NAIT is the Brotherhood” and wishing to preserve “the Islam of flexibil-
ity and commitment to faith rather than fundamentalism and tension.” After a bitter and sometimes violent struggle, the mosque was deeded to NAIT in 1981.

Elkadi Becomes Brotherhood Treasurer

Around the same time NAIT was created, Elkadi and his wife relocated to the Springfield, Missouri, area from Monroe, Louisiana. The Chicago Tribune reported that the Elkadis had originally emigrated to Monroe in 1967, presumably from Austria, for Ahmed to continue his medical training.65 Public records confirm that an “A. Elkadi” was employed in 1968 by Conway Memorial Hospital in Monroe.66 According to the Tribune, the Elkadis joined the Cultural Society at some point following their arrival in the U.S.

Public records and newspaper articles confirm that the Elkadis lived in Springfield, probably from 1973 to 1977, where he became a physician and part of a surgical practice there.67 The Elkadis also received their citizenship in April, 1977, and recorded the birth of a child.68 69 The Tribune investigation reports that during this time:

Elkadi had moved to Missouri and, he says, become treasurer of the U.S. Brotherhood, collecting money from members from across the country. His wife was the unofficial bookkeeper, tracking who was behind on dues. Members were required to pay three percent of their income per year, with the money going to travel, books, and annual conferences…. The conferences were held under the Cultural Society name, usually in large hotels and always on Memorial Day weekend. They were invitation-only, with word spread through the prayer groups. Some years, up to one thousand people attended; every other year, elections were held.70

Confirming this information, on October 28, 1974, the “Cultural Society, Inc.” was registered as a Missouri Benevolent Corporation with the following officers and board members:71 Ahmed Elkadi (president), Mohammed Shamma (vice-president and NAIT incorporator), Mohammed Jaghlit (treasurer), Rabi Ahmad (board member, MSA secretary-general in 1979,72 and a neurosurgeon at the University of Missouri), and Mozaffar Partowmah (Iranian-born Sunni board member, one-time MSA president, and a radiologist).

At some point, the Chicago Tribune reported that Elkadi served as the president of NAIT, further suggesting that NAIT was, in essence, the investment vehicle for the U.S. MB.73
Parallel International Organizing

While helping create the early U.S. MB infrastructure; Barzinji, Totonji, and al-Talib also helped to establish important international Islamic student organizations based in Saudi Arabia. A letter from Totonji, written in December 1966 while he was MSA chairman, showed a clear interest in establishing such organizations:

It has been for a long time the aim of the Muslim students all over the world to form an international Muslim students’ body which would represent their feelings and desires, and would be able to represent them in all the occasions when the need arises. As you are well aware, there are two international student organizations in the world representing the two major political camps in various parts of the world. It is nigh time that we should try to form this Muslim student body. In the International Seminar held in Nigeria on July 2 through 10, it was unanimously adopted to form such an organization, and they set up a preparatory committee in Nigeria to work towards … this goal. They had also decided to hold a preparatory meeting in Sudan to outline and establish a constitution for such an organization. The Muslim Student Association of the U.S. and Canada, in its last annual general convention in Ann Arbor, Michigan, held on September 2 through 6, unanimously adopted to work towards the establishment of such an organization. A committee was established to work for this goal. It is my pleasure to tell you that we are willing to cooperate with you and all the other Muslim student organizations all over the world to bring this association into reality as soon as possible.74

Following the series of exploratory meetings in Africa, an organizational meeting was held in Mecca during February 1969 and a draft constitution for the organization circulated. The International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), an international counterpart to MSA, was founded later in 1969. The IIFSO held its first and second meetings in 1969 and 1971 at a mosque in Aachen, known to be the center of the Syrian MB in Germany.75 A letter to the UN secretary-general from Totonji on August 24, 1969, identifies Totonji as the first IIFSO secretary-general and, al-Talib followed as the second secretary-general according to his own biography.76 77

Following the establishment of the IIFSO, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was created with its headquarters in Saudi Arabia. As the IIFSO website explains:

It was out of the IIFSO’s experience of success that WAMY was born. WAMY was founded in 1972 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, at an international meeting of Islamic workers involved in youth activities and representatives of youth organizations. It
was established to help youth organizations around the world implement their planned projects.78

Barzinji describes himself as a founding member of WAMY, and Totonji served as the deputy to the first secretary-general (Dr. Abdul Hamid Abu-Sulayman).79 80 81 The following history of Islamic organizing in the Caribbean illustrates the close connections among MSA, IIFSO, and WAMY during these early years:

IIFSO’s and WAMY’s organizational structure placed the Caribbean as a sub-region within a larger region, including the US and Canada and South America. Having contributed to the formation of WAMY and having representation in WAMY, the IIFSO’s efforts in the Caribbean were linked with WAMY’s and coordinated from the U.S. The resources of the MSA of the U.S. and Canada and ISNA were also mobilized to further the aims of WAMY and IIFSO in the Caribbean. During the formative years of IIFSO and WAMY, Totonji held key positions in both. He was the Assistant Secretary-General of WAMY during its first ten years and Secretary-General of IIFSO for the first four years, and remained as an ex-officio member in IIFSO…. He visited the Caribbean three times: first in 1968—before IIFSO and WAMY were formed—when he visited Trinidad, Barbados, and Guyana. His two other visits were to Trinidad in 1994 and 1995. He has probably earned the title of “patron” of the Islamic work in the region.82

A history of Islam in South Africa also indicates that Totonji and Sakr were among the early scholars to visit the country on lecture tours between 1971 and 1974 as guests of the newly formed Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa.83

Nada International

Following their work in establishing IIFSO and WAMY, Barzinji and al-Talib began working for Yusuf Nada in Saudi Arabia where Nada had developed substantial business operations in the Kingdom involving his cement business. Nada had also formed a close business and personal relationship with Ghaleb Ali Himmat who had by that time forced Said Ramadan out of the Munich mosque commission, assuming control of the organization himself. A Wall Street Journal report explains how the relationship between Nada and Himmat developed:

During the 1969 coup in Libya, Nada’s contacts there evaporated, and he said that he had to be smuggled out of the country. His business in ruins, Nada said he had
a nervous breakdown and went to a clinic in the German spa town of Wiesbaden. He decided he needed a safe haven to operate and moved to Campione d’Italia, an Italian enclave in Switzerland near Lake Lugano. Nada and Himmat became inseparable. Himmat asked Nada to join the Islamic Society of Southern Germany (the new name for Munich’s mosque-construction commission), and in 1971 he did so.84

From 1978 to 1982, Nada recorded the birth of three of his children in the U.S., telling a Wall Street Journal interviewer that he had “business interests” in the U.S.85 86 One of the children was born in Pensacola, Florida, during the same time that Elkadi was serving as Director of Surgical Residency at a Pensacola hospital.87

On December 7, 1976, Nada established Nada International in Liechtenstein, a company that appears to have been the center of his Saudi business operations.88 89 On January 31, 1978, Barzinji and al-Talib, together with Shamma, were elected to the company board of Nada International and remained there until their resignations on September 19, 1983.90 91 Himmat was appointed to the board on February 24, 1978. In an interview, Nada acknowledged that from 1976 to 1981 al-Talib was on the board of one his companies in Liechtenstein, and also that Barzinji was “managing our company in Riyadh” along with al-Talib.92 A business database also lists Barzinji as Vice-President of Nada International from 1977 to 1982 and lists al-Talib as the company’s Vice-President of Engineering from 1974 to 1982.93 In April 1978, Nada also sponsored al-Talib for membership in the IGD e.V.94
MAJOR FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
(1975-1984)

According to the al-Noman speech, a new period for the U.S. MB began in 1975 with what he called the “era for the dedication of general activism.” He characterizes this period as being marked by an influx of youth and the formation of unidentified “general activism organizations:”

During this time period, leaders of the Group were dedicated to the general activism organizations which where the formation phase which took a lot of their time and all of that was at the expense of the movement on the special domestic activism. During this time period, there was a big desire to come to America to study and large delegations have youth come to the country, most people were committed to the dawa in his native country.95

During this time, al-Noman also says that Brotherhood “fund-raising campaigns,” presumably targeting Middle East sources, resulted in strong “foreign connections:”

... during the same time, the Ikhwans’ foreign connections became strong and that was due to the fundraising campaigns which were launched by the Ikhwans …, which made it possible for the Ikhwans in the leadership to meet leadership from the Orient. Therefore, membership here of the brothers who were members in their countries was easier, more easier.

However, he also reports that the influx of members linked to the foreign Brotherhood resulted in new problems and a splintering of the Brotherhood in the U.S.:

Those people come to the Movement and found some organizational practices such as means and priorities which were different from the ones they were accustomed to in their countries. So, they started to inquire, “Where is the strictness in the conditions? And where are these conditions? Where is the secrecy, where is organizational connection and where are the educational programs? What are goals of the Group here? What are goals of … the goals of these programs?” All of these questions were resurfacing on the field anew. Therefore, regional organizational pockets started to form during this time period. Also, rumors and suspicious started to circulate among
the ranks of the Group regarding individuals in the leadership, So, the Movement then-current situation exploded during the camp of ’77 and a new leadership came on board in ’78 whose work was bitter as it was trying to purge the Group’s body from regional restrictions and gatherings or from the organizational pockets and tied its parts together but, during this time period, it was a non-harmonious leadership and going back and forth was evident in its positions.96

He goes on to report that annual conferences from 1977 to 1979 addressed these problems and resulted in a more accountable leadership of the U.S. Brotherhood:

Despite that, it managed to place the Ikhwans in front of the true picture of their reality and to shake them deeply from the inside. Therefore, the conferences of ’77, ’78 and ’79 used to end with tears and pain but, to say the truth, were very important for what happened after that. This time period was characterized by change; a change in Ikhwans who wanted to change the status quo and others who want to maintain the status quo…. Also, for the first time, actual accountability of the leadership was enacted even though this accountability was unfair at times. In the past, leadership was seen as a group of infallible Ikhwans. Therefore, holding them accountable was rare or simple. Despite that, organizational pockets continued to constitute the biggest danger for the unity of the Group.97

Al-Noman concludes by describing a more stable leadership structure for the U.S. Brotherhood, including a “dedicated” leader known as “General Masul:”

But, this time period came to an end and the Group became more accepting of change, stability and moving forward. The elections of ’79 came along and the Shura Council came in ’80 and ’81 and the road in front of it was paved and work began to unify the Group’s ranks, codification of work and pushing the Movement’s forward. For the first time then, we had a General Masul who was dedicated to the Group’s affairs alone and also the Shura Council started to play its true role which is planning and monitoring the executive leadership. The executive leadership was carrying its tasks through a Shura atmosphere and continuous contacts. Its meetings were held consistently on monthly basis. The mid-level leadership which was represented by the Masuls of the regions and the regions’ councils play their natural role as well through applying the principle of decentralization. Work started to be clearer and more programmed. The current Shura Council came on board to finish what its brother started on the span of past seven years to lead this Group to new horizons, God’s willing, keeping its eyes on huge goals among which
is the settlement of this Group and minding some of the regional experiences and
the turns of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in North America.\textsuperscript{98}

The “General Masul” referred to above may be Elkadi, who, according to the \textit{Chicago Tribune}
investigation, was elected president of the U.S. MB in 1984. By this time the \textit{Chicago Tribune}
reported that Elkadi, probably in 1977 or 1978, had relocated from Missouri to Panama City,
Florida, where he established the Akbar Clinic. This Islamic medical center was funded with $2.4
million from a Luxembourg bank managed by his father-in-law (Abu-Saud). Inside the clinic,
Elkadi set up a small mosque and an Islamic school.

\section*{The Islamic Society of North America}

\textbf{Significant changes in} the U.S. Brotherhood front organizations were also occurring during
this period. First, in 1975, the MSA developed plans to set up a permanent secretariat and a cen-
ter for Islamic activities in North America and the MSA headquarters was moved from Gary to
Indianapolis.\textsuperscript{99} The reasons given for choosing Indianapolis included: low crime, cost of living,
good educational institutions, social tolerance, and accessibility.\textsuperscript{100} Second, on June 23, 1976, the
Cultural Society was registered as a “non-profit foreign corporation” in Indiana with Elkadi’s
home address in Springfield, Missouri, listed as the business address.\textsuperscript{101} Elkadi was listed as the
president, and Shamma was listed as the secretary using an address in Indianapolis. Finally, in
September 1976, NAIT acquired 124 acres of land a few miles west of the Indianapolis airport and
MSA offices were immediately moved into the existing buildings.\textsuperscript{102 103}

According to an account by al-Talib, a meeting was held in 1977 in Plainfield which established
a task force that recommended establishing a “broader umbrella organization”—ISNA:

As the MSA reached its mid-teens it began preparing for an expanded role in the
service of Islam. It called an historic meeting of a cross-section of Islamic workers,
in Plainfield, Indiana, in early 1397/1977. This meeting set up a task force to rec-
ommend a new organizational structure to respond to the increasing challenges and
responsibilities emerging in the growing North American Muslim communities. The
task force concluded that the new environment would be best served by establish-
ing a broader umbrella organization called “ISNA.” This was accomplished during
Rabi’ al-Awwal 1403/January 1983. The MSA; the new Muslim Community Asso-
ciation of the U.S. and Canada (MCA); and the three professional associations,
namely the Islamic Medical Association (IMA), the Association of Muslim Scientists
and Engineers (AMSE), and the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS)
became its founding constituents…. Three of its service institutions are NAIT, the
Following the 1977 meeting, a number of developments took place over the next two years concerning the new headquarters facility. First, in May 1977, Barzinji was quoted in local news media about NAIT’s plans to construct a mosque on the land purchased by NAIT. He was described at that time as the “general manager” of NAIT. Barziji’s role as NAIT’s general manager is confirmed by a business database. Second, in January 1978, plans were announced for a 42-acre compound on the Plainfield, Indiana site to include a mosque, classrooms, residences, gymnasium, and recreational area. Third, in early March 1978, the local zoning authority approved the plans for the complex which had an estimated cost between $5 million and $10 million dollars. Finally, in October 1979, Cultural Society officer Partowmah was identified in a newspaper article as MSA Information Director, and Cultural Society officer Ahmed Rabi was identified as the MSA secretary-general. Rabi said at the time that MSA was operating an Afghanistan relief fund and was sending doctors to the country though Pakistan.

There are varying reports on when construction on the facility actually began, but what was called “Phase 1” appears to have been completed in January 1983, and consisted of a $3.5 million 500-person mosque, 80,000-volume library, and a research facility. The Washington Post has reported that the complex was funded by $21 million raised from Brotherhood figures al-Qaradawi and Nada, as well as the emir of Qatar. As discussed above, Barzinji and al-Talib were also working for Nada’s company in Saudi Arabia during the entire time the headquarters facility was being planned, funded, and completed.

According to local histories, the compound reportedly began serving or planned to serve as headquarters for MSA, ISNA, and NAIT, as well as for other affiliated organizations including: IMA, MAYA, MCA Foundation for International Development, and the Malaysian Islamic Studies Group (MISG).

One of the local histories refers to ISNA in 1985 as being “led by the Muslim Brotherhood.” Confirming this relationship is an internal U.S. Brotherhood document which states:

In 1980, the Muslim Students Union was developed into ISNA to include all the Muslim congregation from immigrants and citizens, and to be a nucleus for the Islamic Movement in North America ...

The statement goes on to say that the Ikhwan initially exercised leadership and direction of ISNA. ISNA was officially incorporated in Indiana on July 14, 1981, with the stated purpose “to advance the cause of Islam and serve Muslims in North America so as to enable them to adopt Islam as a complete way of life.” The address for ISNA at that time appears to be the Plainfield property where the new facility was built. The three incorporators were listed as: Iqbal J. Unus, Talat Sultan, and Mahmoud Rashdan.
The initial board of directors was listed as: Sayyed M. Syeed, M. Naziruddin Ali, Syed Imtiaz Ahmad, and Haroon Qazi. Almost all of these individuals were known to have been part of MSA.

It is notable that, despite the role of the U.S. MB in creating ISNA, none of the three Iraqi Brotherhood individuals, nor any Arab individuals other than Rashdan and Qazi, are listed in the initial ISNA leadership. Instead, almost the entire leadership appears to consist of individuals associated with Pakistan and/or the Jaamat-e-Islami. It does, however, appear that Saudi money was funding ISNA from the very beginning of the organization. Kaukab Siddique, editor of the Islamist periodical *New Trend*, has linked this funding directly to the U.S. MB:

*New Trend* tried right from 1977 to warn the people about this danger of monopoly created by funds coming in from Saudi Arabia…The “Ikhwan mafia,” a group of six, were bringing in funds from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The movement for reform was quashed by the mafia (revered “elders” of ISNA) who went from city to city.121

Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq, an associate professor of economics and finance at Upper Iowa University, has reported that the Saudi funds were a means by which the U.S. Brotherhood attempted to control their organizations:

It was in 1981 when I first attended an ISNA convention. I attended its convention again in 1985. The Saudi money was having serious influence on ISNA during these periods [and] caused significant problems in various communities, where there were attempts to control *khutbah*—activities and services of those mosques and centers that were with the ISNA’s Trust. We have experienced this first-hand, even in academic-type affiliates, such as AMSS, where I have presented papers several times.122

**Islamic Association for Palestine**

In 1981, around the same time that ISNA was being created, the U.S. Brotherhood created the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) which al-Noman refers to as “the last front formed by the group.” Another internal Brotherhood document describes the founding of the IAP:

In 1981, the Ikhwan founded the Islamic Association for Palestine to serve the cause of Palestine on the political and media fronts. The Association has absorbed most of the Ikhwan’s Palestinian energy at the leadership and grassroots levels, in addition to some of the brothers from the other countries. Attention was given to the
new Arab arrivals, immigrants, and citizens in general, while focusing on the Palestinians in particular.123

A U.S. Treasury Department intelligence official has also described the founding of the IAP, characterizing the organization as “intimately tied” to Hamas:

The IAP is intimately tied to the most senior Hamas leadership; in fact it was originally formed in 1981 by Dr. Aly Mishal at the personal direction of Khaled Mishal (who was then a senior MB activist and would later become secretary-general of Hamas).124 125

The IAP will be discussed in further detail later in this report.
The International Institute of Islamic Thought

During the same time period in which ISNA was being created, a parallel effort was being undertaken by the global MB to create an intellectual infrastructure. Soliman Biheiri, an Egyptian businessman linked to Saudi Arabia and the MB, told U.S. Customs agents in 2003 that he “had heard of a famous Islamic conference in Lugano, Switzerland, concerning the contemporary problems of the Muslim umma.” Biheiri stated that he believed this conference took place in 1973 at Nada’s home in Lugano, and that “many high-ranking individuals in the Islamic world took part.” He also stated that he believed that the conference provided a “blueprint” for much of the worldwide Islamist movements in the 1980s.127 128

A meeting in a different year, which may refer to the same meeting identified by Biheiri, was reported by an Islamic author who stated that Totonji and Barzinji participated in a 1977 conference held in Lugano. This conference was described as the “first organized conference on the Muslim intellectual crisis” and was said to have laid the groundwork for the creation of an organization known as the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT).

One of the main objectives of AMSS was to do the groundwork for the Islamization of the social sciences. The identity of the initiators of this program is not the subject of this study. But, several of those involved in the AMSS’s establishment were also involved in founding the International Institute of Islamic Thought. This institute grew out of the first organized conference on the Muslim intellectual crisis, which was held in Lugano, Switzerland, during 1977.129

The Lugano conference was said to have been hosted by Abu-Saud, who in addition to being Elkadi’s father-in-law has been identified as an important figure in the Egyptian MB and an expert in Islamic banking. Other important attendees included the following individuals from both the U.S. and global Muslim Brotherhood, and related organizations: Rashdan, former secretary general of MSA and ISNA founder; al-Faruqi, of the MSA; Abu-Sulayman, founder of WAMY; al-Qaradawi; Muhammad al-Mubarak, probably a professor at Muhammad ibn Saud University; Jamaluddin Atia (a.k.a. Gamal Attia), an expert in Islamic banking; Khurshid Ahmad, leader of the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami; Ahmad al-Assal, president of the International Islamic University, Islamabad; and Taha Jaber al-'Alwani, of WAMY.
At the meeting, it was decided that Abu-Sulayman would come to Philadelphia and establish and register IIIT in the U.S. IIIT was subsequently incorporated in Pennsylvania on November 6, 1980, using the home of al-Faruqi as the registered address. The founding documents were reported to include the following members of the IIIT Board of Trustees: Abu-Sulayman as president; al-Faruqi as secretary and treasurer; and al-‘Alwani, Barzinji, and a certain Anwar Ibrahim as members.

Although not listed in the IIIT incorporation papers, Totonji has identified himself as being involved with the founding, and has subsequently often been referred to as a vice-president or director of IIIT. In 1985, IIIT filed registration as a Virginia corporation with an address in Herndon, where it is currently located. The original mission statement of IIT has been described as follows:

…to train and prepare Islamic scholars in the field of the Islamization of social sciences and to encourage them to research and write on social science topics from an Islamic perspective.…

It also included publishing Islamic social science textbooks to be distributed in the Muslim world.

Al-Faruqi, who was described as one of the “foremost workers” for the establishment of IIIT, was appointed as a director. One source claims that it was al-Faruqi who secured $25 million from the Saudi Islamic Development Bank in order to establish IIIT. Al-Faruqi, the son of a Muslim judge, was a Palestinian who had fled to the U.S. in 1948. Following time spent in Egypt (at Al-Azhar) and Pakistan (Institute of Islamic Research, in Karachi), al-Faruqi returned to the U.S.:

Disillusioned by the lack of immediate change in the Islamic educational system, Faruqi … became a visiting professor at the University of Chicago in 1963. From 1964 to 1968 he served as an associate professor of Islamic Studies at Syracuse University. He then became a professor of Islam at Temple University … where he spent the rest of his career. Al-Faruqi’s involvement with the MSA had a profound influence on the spiritual evolution he went through during the early days of his academic career at Temple University. These events prompted him to develop his notions on the Islamization of knowledge and the revival of Islamic social sciences. They also led to the establishment of the AMSS, over which al-Faruqi presided from 1972 to 1978 and from 1980 to 1982. Pursuant to this involvement, al-Faruqi concentrated on spreading and reviving an awareness of Islam, chiefly by means of education and public relations. He created a unique Islamic graduate program at Temple, which focused on the Islamic social sciences, emphasizing such topics as Islamic law, Islamic economics, and Islamic sociology. In 1980 al-Faruqi was elected the secretary-treasurer of the newly established International Institute of Islamic Thought in Maryland.
Al-Faruqi was a pioneer in what has been called “the Islamization of knowledge,” explained as follows:

Al-Faruqi attempted to articulate an Islamic worldview by fortifying it with rational and scientific arguments. In the latter part of his career, he became more and more concerned with the spiritual aspects of Islam. He advocated a radical Islamization of new knowledge. He recognized that the crisis of the modern world was the crisis of knowledge. And this crisis, al-Faruqi thought, could only be cured via a new synthesis of all knowledge in an Islamic epistemological framework. The “Islamization of Knowledge” project sought to arouse Muslims to become active participants in intellectual life and contribute to it from an Islamic perspective. But for unknown reasons, al-Faruqi—and the institute his thought inspired—left natural sciences out of his program. Thus his views only apply to social sciences.¹³⁸

SAAR Foundation

On July 23, 1983, a non-profit corporation known as the SAAR Foundation was established in Herndon, Virginia. The articles of incorporation listed al-Talib and Barzinji as incorporators. The initial board of directors included al-Talib, Barzinji, al-Faruqi, and Totonji. The board also included Abudl-hamid Abu-Sulayman, as well as possible members of the Saudi al-Rajhi banking family. One media report, based on an interview with former SAAR officer Dr. Yaqub Mirza, explains the origins of the SAAR Foundation as follows:

SAAR is the brainchild of a group of Muslim scholars and scientists from the Middle East and Asia. In the 1970s the group started to raise funds and donate the money to finance anti-hunger, educational, and appropriate-technology projects in developing Islamic countries. Their biggest donor is the al-Rajhi family….¹³⁹

According to Mirza, the foundation changed course in 1983. It moved to Herndon, incorporated as a nonprofit foundation, and altered its fundraising approach. “We asked investors to give us one large lump sum rather than smaller amounts every year,” he explains. “This way we were bringing in from $10 million to $20 million a year. Then we started investing the principal.”¹⁴⁰

However, during a March 1999 audit, SAAR officials told the IRS, “SAAR was created for people overseas to pay scholarships for Muslims in the United States.” Mirza also told the auditors that SAAR had been founded as a charitable organization in the United States to earn a better yield on funds collected in Saudi Arabia for charitable purposes. This was done because the members of the al-Rajhi family believed that, by investing in the
United States, they could earn a higher yield on the funds collected prior to the time they were disbursed for charitable purposes.\footnote{141}

The U.S. government has stated that in the late 1970s and 1980s, SAAR “moved large amounts of funds into the United States to support their organizational infrastructure.” In 1980, a U.S. government agent testified that Ibrahim Hassaballa, an individual associated with SAAR, brought $3,388,000 in cash into the United States from Saudi Arabia. This had allowed SAAR to “both start and acquire businesses and organizations in the United States.”\footnote{142} \footnote{143}

While there is no available documentation to substantiate the claim of charitable activity in the 1970s, it is clear that beginning in early 1980s, SAAR established an extensive financial empire that included a Chilean ranch and a juice manufacturer, U.S real estate and poultry farms, and a large dairy farm in Zimbabwe. Mirza appears to have been responsible for much of SAAR’s business activity, later serving as vice-president and president.\footnote{144} \footnote{145} \footnote{146} The \textit{Washington Post} explains:

In 1984, Yaqub Mirza, a Pakistani native who received a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Texas in Dallas, used money from the al-Rajhisch to start SAAR in Virginia, with the goal of spreading Islam and doing charitable work. Mirza also sought out business ventures for SAAR. By investing the al-Rajhisch’ money with Washington real estate developer Mohamed Hadid, he made SAAR one of the region’s biggest landlords in the 1980s. The SAAR network also became one of South America’s biggest apple growers and the owner of one of America’s top poultry firms, Mar-Jac Poultry in Georgia. “The funds came very easily,” said a businessman who dealt with SAAR. “If they wanted a few million dollars, they called the al-Rajhisch, who would send it along.”\footnote{147}

Sometimes described as a “financial genius, Mirza was formerly president of MSA, and also had been the Caribbean representative of both WAMY and the IIFSO in the 1970s and early 1980s.\footnote{148} \footnote{149} Al-Talib and Barzinji were partners in many of the U.S. corporations established by Mirza, and all three lived close to each other in homes built by a SAAR-affiliated company.

Most of the businesses established or acquired appear to have been placed in two trusts established by SAAR: the Safa Trust and the York Foundation. The tax-free income generated by the trusts was then used to fund a wide variety of Islamic and political organizations. Donations made by SAAR in its early years are unavailable, but tax returns for the Safa Trust and York Foundation for 2000-2001 showed that large donations were made to IIIT in the U.S and France, with the second largest amount going to either the York Foundation or an “offshore” entity identified as the York International Trust on the Isle of Man.\footnote{150} Smaller donations were made to U.S. MB entities such as ISNA, and to political groups favorable to the Brotherhood or its positions.
THE ERA OF PROBLEMS
(1985-1994)

Leadership

Al-Noman’s history in the U.S. MB appears to end sometime in the mid 1980s. However, other internal documents provide a picture of the Brotherhood leadership structure in the following years. All available evidence suggests that by this point the U.S. MB was a highly organized, hierarchical organization complete with leadership councils, committees, regions, and constituent organizations. A spreadsheet from an internal U.S. Brotherhood document dated December 18, 1988 (see Appendix), lists the last names of the U.S. Brotherhood Shura Council.151 “Elkadi” is at the head of the list, presumably indicating that Ahmed Elkadi was the head of the Shura Council at that time. Other individuals of interest on the Shura Committee may include:152 Jordanian-born Omar al-Soubani; Dr. Mousa Abu Marzook, head of the Palestine Committee; Mohammed Jaghliit, SAAR’s Cultural Society officer; Hani Sakr; Ziad Abu-Ghanimeh, of the Jordanian MB; and Mohammed Akram Adlouni.

The same spreadsheet identifies a number of committees, focusing on such issues as finance, politics, social issues, curricula, security, and Palestine. Those identified as heads of committees may include individuals mentioned throughout this report: Mohamed Hanooti, Jamal Badawi, Bassam Othman, Abdurahman Alamoudi, and Hammad Zaki.

The spreadsheet also identifies several organizations as being part of the U.S. MB. These groups were AMSS, AMSE, IMA, ISNA, MAYA, MSA, MISQ, and NAIT. The Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA) is also listed and Elkadi is known to have played an important role in MYNA.153 A 1991 internal Brotherhood document describes the “Youths Organization in North America” as follows:

In 1985, the Youths Organization in North America was founded as an independent organization, but with a relationship with the ISNA. The Ikhwan played no role in founding it or directing it, but the matter is gradually improving. Its work is centered on children of Muslim congregations formed from immigrants and citizens in North America. It has a general annual conference and regional conferences across the continent.154

Noticeably absent from the list is IIIT, although AMSS and Abu-Sulayman—important parts of the
Safa Group—are included. The 1991 document contains an expanded “list of our organizations and organizations of our friends” (see Appendix), and IIIT is identified there at the bottom of the list.

A 1992 U.S. Brotherhood phonebook has a “Board of Directors” list, likely the same as that of the Shura Council.\textsuperscript{155} Four of the six Shura Council members listed above are on this list: Elkadi, Adlouni, Sakr and al-Soubani. Additional individuals of interest may include Ahmed Elhatab of MYNA, Hamed al-Ghazali of MSA, Bassam Othman (aka Bassam Othman) of NAIT, and Jamal Badawi of both ISNA and NAIT. Also listed was Zaid Naman, a.k.a. Zeid al-Noman. Other individuals from the 1988 spreadsheet are listed in this phone book as “Masuls” or leaders of different Brotherhood organizational regions in the U.S.

**Problems**

**U.S. Brotherhood documents** from this period suggest that the Brotherhood leadership was facing a number of challenges.

1. **Political Action**

The first challenge facing the U.S. Brotherhood was the issue of whether or not to participate in the American political system. A former editor of ISNA’s publication has written about criticism within ISNA during the mid 1980s. Such internal criticism focused on the lack of political activity undertaken by the organization and its leadership, which was seen as being dominated by MB and Jamaat-e-Islami individuals “more concerned about Islamic movements within their home countries.” Despite the misgivings of the ISNA leadership, the reality was that other Islamic organizations were engaging in political activity. For example, the Islamic Center of Southern California, under the direction of two leaders with likely Egyptian MB backgrounds, had launched the Political Action Committee of the Islamic Center of Southern California in 1986.\textsuperscript{156} Adding to the pressure on ISNA was the perceived influence of pro-Israeli “PACs.” ISNA, as the leading Islamic organization in North America, was forced to begin considering political action inside America.

On December 6th, 1986, ISNA’s planning committee held a public hearing in Plainfield to “identify what a broad cross section of Muslims in America viewed as strategic priorities for Muslims in the next decade.” The committee report called for ISNA to engage in political action:

> In order to exert influence on political decision-making and legislation in North America, ISNA should launch a campaign to educate Muslim citizens about their voting rights and mobilize them to vote on issues affecting Islam and Muslims. On a longer-term basis ISNA should develop communication with and among politically active Muslims and establish a separate political organization in due course.”\textsuperscript{157}
A speech given by an ISNA leader in the 1980s provides a glimpse into how at least some of the leadership viewed political action:

Ultimately we can never be full citizens of this country, because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country.... We can be citizens in the sense that we try to influence American policy.\textsuperscript{158}

ISNA announced in November 1987 that it had formed its own PAC (ISNA-PAC), with Abdurrahman Alamoudi as the “leading force” of the ISNA-PAC. Alamoudi had been the ISNA regional representative for the Washington, DC, metropolitan area (and was previously president of MSA and executive assistant to the president of SAAR).\textsuperscript{159} He would later go on to form the American Muslim Council (AMC) with Elkadi’s father-in-law Abu-Saud in July 1990. The AMC was designed to encourage Muslims to become involved in politics and other civic activities.\textsuperscript{160} Alamoudi immediately began serving as the group’s director.\textsuperscript{161}

A 1991 internal Brotherhood memo suggests that the U.S. Brotherhood leadership may have been seeking expanded political action capabilities. The memo proposes the creation of a “Political Organization” to include: a central political party, local political offices, symbols, new relationships and alliances, an American Organization for Islamic Political Action, and “advanced information centers.”\textsuperscript{162}

2. ISNA

The second and perhaps the most significant challenge facing the U.S. Brotherhood leadership was the perception at the time that the Brotherhood had lost control of ISNA. The struggle to control ISNA appears to have begun with the 1986 ISNA elections. A former editor of the ISNA publication \textit{Islamic Horizons} has reported that Zaki Hammad, IIIT’s favored candidate, and the former leader of the NAIT-controlled Bridgeview mosque discussed earlier, was elected as ISNA President in 1986 after conflicts emerged among Brotherhood factions within ISNA:

Splits among Ikhwan factions constituting ISNA became apparent during the 1986 ISNA elections. It is alleged by some ISNA members that the nomination process was postponed several times until IIIT was able to rally enough support to ensure Ahmad’s Zaki’s (supposedly a member of the Egyptian Ikhwan) election. Evidently, some of the old guards in the more “orthodox” Ikhwan supported Shawki Zahran over Ahmad Zaki. The Sudanese, Tunisian, and more liberal factions of the Ikhwan supported past ISNA president Qutbi Mehdi. The Malaysian students were split with the Ikhwan-modeled MISG, supporting their champion Zaki. The members of the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM)—still bitter about what they
took to be Ahmad Zaki’s involvement in splitting the Malaysian students in America—supported Mehdi. The Sudanese attempted to rally several groups—including the American Muslims—behind Mehdi, but they had waited too long and the other factions of the Ikhwan had already launched a telephone and letter campaign to inform fellow MB members how to vote. Upon Zaki’s election as ISNA President, some obvious changes in representation within the ISNA committee structure and participation occurred….163

The author goes on to identify changes in ISNA that occurred as a result of Zaki Hammad’s election. First, IIIT director al-Alwani took over the chairmanship of the ISNA Fiqh Committee from his Sudanese predecessor. Second, Jamaat-e-Islami member Talat Sultan was relieved from his leadership of ISNA’s Department of Education. Third, more speakers from overseas were invited to the 1987 ISNA annual convention. Finally, MAYA membership now automatically included ISNA membership and ISNA voting rights.

However, Zaki Hammad was replaced as ISNA president sometime in 1990-1991. The current ISNA secretary-general has said that Zaki Hammad was “expelled” from ISNA on bad terms, stating, “he might not have been sharing the same vision [as] this organization….164 Zaki Hammad was replaced by Indian-born Syed Imtiaz Ahmad (an original ISNA board member, see above), whose biographies suggest may have come from a Jaamat-e-Islami rather than an MB background.165

By May 1991 an internal memo complained that the Brotherhood presence in ISNA had been on the decline:

The ISNA has developed significantly in the eighties by the Ikhwan’s leadership, and [now] direction of it started to gradually decrease due to their scarce presence...166

This view is confirmed by the Chicago Tribune investigation:

The Islamic Society of North America, the umbrella group for the Muslim Youth of North America and the Muslim Students Association, says Brotherhood members helped form those groups but that their overall influence has been limited.

A 1991-1992 MB work plan suggests, “removing Ikhwan’s resentment toward ISNA” and ”restoring the existence of the Group in ISNA.”167

In December 1991, a letter—sent out on the Islamic Coordinating Committee letterhead and signed by Committee Chairman Elkadi—seemed to suggest the ground for creating a new Islamic organization.168 169  The letter explains that the Committee had been established at a 1991 ISNA convention to deal with the future development of Islam and the Muslim community in America, which had grown faster than expected. The letter explained that this growth required “special
attention” to the quality of Islamic work, and noted that some Islamic organizations were working in isolation. It called for “well-coordinated development and progress.” The letter said that a conference had been proposed for April 17-19, 1992, to deal with “the following problems:” bringing together all Islamic centers and Muslim organizations in North America, enhancing the quality of Islamic work already in progress, exploring all existing opportunities and plans for community development, preparing agendas for future action, and creating a formal or informal institutional framework for to ensure the continuity of this effort.

Further evidence that the U.S. Brotherhood leadership was seeking to establish a new organization is found in another Brotherhood document:

We have a seed for a “comprehensive dawa educational” organization ... the dawa section in ISNA, the Badawi Foundation, the center run by brother al-Ghazali, the Dawa Center, the Dawa Committee, and brother Shaker al-Sayyed are seeking to establish [such an organization ] now in addition to other dawa efforts here and there.... 170

The Muslim American Society

It is likely that a new organization known as the Muslim American Society (MAS) was created by the U.S. Brotherhood to meet the challenges discussed above, and to fill the void left by the Brotherhood vacuum in ISNA. The Chicago Tribune reported that Mohammed Mahdi Akef, now the Egyptian Brotherhood Supreme Guide, says he helped found MAS by lobbying for the change during trips to the U.S.171 The MAS was registered as an Illinois corporation on June 11, 1993, and the founding documents list the following individuals as the initial board of directors: al-Soubani (Lansing, Michigan), Badawi (Halifax, Nova Scotia), and Elkadi (Panama City, Florida). Gaddour Saidi of Garden Grove, California; and Mohammed Elharezi of Justice, Illinois, were listed as additional incorporators. As noted above, all of these individuals were known to be part of the U.S. Brotherhood leadership. A group of relatively unknown individuals were listed as MAS officers including Esam Omeish as President.

The MAS explains its creation in language consistent with the 1992 Elkadi letter:

Since its inception ISNA, and other organizations affiliated with it, worked diligent-ly with those who were to become the founding members and future leadership of MAS, towards the advancement of the cause of Islam and Muslims in North America. Mindful of the dynamic changes that are taking place within the Muslim community and its surroundings, and keeping an eye on the future, a number of Islamic workers and Islamic movement followers decided in 1992, after a painstak-
The measured and tedious process of soul-searching and consultation, to launch the Muslim American Society in order to complement the work accomplished over the last three decades, and to lay the ground for the Islamic effort needed to face the next century’s challenges.\textsuperscript{172}

The \textit{Chicago Tribune} investigation reports on one aspect of the “soul-searching,” namely whether or not MAS would publicly declare that it was part of the U.S. MB:

In recent years, the U.S. Brotherhood operated under the name “Muslim American Society,” according to documents and interviews. One of the nation’s major Islamic groups, it was incorporated in Illinois in 1993 after a contentious debate among Brotherhood members. Some wanted the Brotherhood to remain underground, while others thought a more public face would make the group more influential. Members from across the country drove to regional meeting sites to discuss the issue. Former member Mustafa Said recalls how he gathered with forty others at a Days Inn on the Alabama-Tennessee border. Many members, he says, preferred secrecy, particularly in case U.S. authorities cracked down on Hamas supporters, including many Brotherhood members. “They were looking at doomsday scenarios,” he says. Elkadi and Akef—a Brotherhood leader in Egypt and now the international head—had pushed for more openness ... “We have a religion, message, morals and principals that we want to carry to the people as God ordered us,” he says. “So why should we work in secrecy?”\textsuperscript{173}

The \textit{Tribune} investigation further reports that MAS decided that it would operate by concealing its MB affiliation:

When the leaders voted, it was decided that Brotherhood members would call themselves the “Muslim American Society,” or MAS, according to documents and interviews. They agreed not to refer to themselves as the “Brotherhood” but to be more publicly active. They eventually created a website and for the first time invited the public to some conferences, which also were used to raise money...An undated internal memo instructed MAS leaders on how to deal with inquiries about the new organization. If asked, “Are you the Muslim Brothers?,” leaders should respond that they are an independent group called the Muslim American Society. “It is a self-explanatory name that does not need further explanation.” And if the topic of terrorism were raised, leaders were told to say that they were against terrorism but that jihad was among a Muslim’s “divine legal rights” to be used to defend himself and his people and to spread Islam.\textsuperscript{174}
A meeting of the Brotherhood Palestine Committee on July 30, 1994, further confirms the role of the MAS as a Brotherhood front organization. An agenda for the meeting refers to:

The activation of the role of [MAS] to educate the brothers in all work centers, mosques, and organizations on the necessity of stopping any contacts with Zionist organizations and the rejection of any future contacts.¹⁷⁵

The MAS would go on to pursue two goals further identified in Brotherhood documents. First, better integration with the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), a U.S. organization representing Jaamat-e-Islami.¹⁷⁶ Second, the development of “comprehensive Islamic facilities in every city:”

The center we seek is the one which constitutes the “axis” of our movement, the “perimeter” of the circle of our work, our “balance center,” the “base” for our rise and our “Dar al-Arqam” to educate us, prepare us, and supply our battalions in addition to being the “niche” of our prayers. This is in order for the Islamic center to turn—in action, not in words—into a seed “for small Islamic society” which is a reflection and a mirror to our central organizations. The center ought to turn into “a beehive” which produces sweet honey. Thus the Islamic center will turn into a place for study, family, battalion, course, seminar, visit, sport, school, social club, women’s gathering, kindergarten for male and female youngsters, the office of the domestic political resolution, and the center for distributing our newspapers, magazines, books, and our audio and visual tapes.¹⁷⁷

Once completed, the centers were to “become fronts for Brotherhood work.”

The Palestine Committee of the U.S. Brotherhood

U.S. prosecutors have said that at the time of the first intifada against Israel in 1987, the governing body of the International Muslim Brotherhood decided to focus its mission on the Palestinian issue, and directed that Palestine Committees be formed in countries throughout the world.¹⁷⁸ A 1991 internal Brotherhood document reports on the U.S. Palestine Committee and the work of its Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) that had been founded in 1981:

The Association’s work has developed a great deal since its inception, particularly with the formation of the Palestine Committee, the beginning of the Intifada at the end of 1987, and the proclamation of the Hamas Movement. The Association has organizations affiliated with it such as The United Association for Studies and Research, the
Occupied Land Fund, the Media Office, dedicated main personnel, several periodicals, research, studies, and field branches in all the regions.\textsuperscript{179 180}

A U.S. Treasury Department intelligence official confirms the connection between the IAP and Hamas:

The founding of IAP six years prior to the formation of Hamas is still further indication of Hamas’s roots in the MB. When the group’s leaders in Gaza made the decision to officially found Hamas in 1987, the IAP became the group’s mouthpiece in North America.”\textsuperscript{181}

There is further evidence confirming the close association of IAP with Hamas following the latter’s founding in 1987. The aforementioned Mousa Abu Marzook, likely a member of the U.S. Brotherhood Shura Council in 1988, was a long-time high-ranking leader of Hamas and is currently described by the U.S. Government as “the Deputy Chief of Hamas’s Political Bureau based in Damascus, Syria. His activities include directing and coordinating terrorist acts by Hamas against soldiers and civilians in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza.”\textsuperscript{182} According to a former Treasury Department intelligence official, Marzook was helping to finance IAP.\textsuperscript{183} In addition, many of the early leaders of IAP were also leaders in two organizations known as the Holy Land Foundation Relief Foundation (HLF or HLFRD)—referred to above as the Occupied Land Fund—and InfoCom, both located in Richardson, Texas. Richardson is the same Dallas suburb where IAP had its headquarters. Both HLF and InfoCom have since been implicated by the U.S. government in the funding of Hamas, and the leaders of HLF and InfoCom have been convicted and/or indicted in connection with this activity.\textsuperscript{184 185}

The former Treasury Department intelligence official has provided details about IAP activities in support of Hamas during this time period. These included: publishing Hamas communiqués that called supporters to jihad and soliciting funds; publishing and distributing the Hamas charter; distributing Hamas’s \textit{Filistine al-Muslima}; supporting suicide bombers; holding conventions and conferences that included pro-Hamas speakers and singers; and organizing rallies for jailed Hamas leaders such as Marzook and Mohammed Salah.\textsuperscript{186 187}

A 1993 phonebook for the Palestine Committee includes many of the individuals and organizations already discussed in this report including\textsuperscript{188}

Omar Al-Soubani (MB Shura)  
Muhammed Al-Jaghlit (Cultural Society, SAAR)  
Mohamed Al-Hanooti (MB Committee head)  
Musa Marzook (MB Shura)  
Muhammed Akram (MB Shura)  
Jamal Sa’id (Bridgeview Mosque)
Other members of the Palestine Committee and the U.S. Brotherhood leadership were present at a meeting held in Philadelphia on October 3, 1993, which was under electronic surveillance by the FBI. According to an FBI document and a recent NEFA Foundation analysis, attendees included IAP officers Omar Ahmad and Nihad Awad, Cultural Society officer and MB leader Ashqar, MB Shura Council member al-Hanooti, and Hamas activists and fundraisers, as well as a Hamas military commander.189 190

The FBI characterized the meeting as significant, since it involved a meeting of senior leaders of Hamas, the HLFRD, and the IAP.191 According to FBI analysis, “the overall goal of the meeting was to develop a strategy to defeat the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord, and to continue and improve their fund-raising and political activities in the United States.” Furthermore, “the participants went to great length and spent much effort hiding their association with the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] ... Instead, they referred to Hamas as ‘Samah’, [and] as ‘The Movement.’” The participants also concluded that they could raise funds, propagate their political goals, affect public opinion, influence U.S. government decision-making, and perhaps one day be a viable alternative to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

FBI documents also noted how participants “mentioned that the democratic environment in the U.S. provided them with a secure, legal base from which to operate.” This would be vital, as many participants “stated a belief that continuation of the Holy War was inevitable.” Indeed, it was resolved that “most or almost all of the funds collected in the future should be directed to enhance [Hamas] and to weaken the self-rule government. Holy War efforts should be supported by increasing spending on the injured, the prisoners and their families and the martyrs and their families.”192

Extensive discussion also focused on the possibility of establishing a new front organization to address some of the challenges faced by IAP. The context of this discussion is not always clear, but Omar Ahmad, a future leader of the new organization to come, spoke of a new “umbrella organization” for public-relations and media functions.193

Later, Mohammed Akram Adlouni argues that a “renowned Islamic organization” could address the needs of the Palestinians better than an organization that was perceived as parochial:

When [the public] feels that a renowned Islamic organization is expressing its point of view, it will be more encouraged to deal with it rather than if it feels an organization is locked in a certain corner.... Opening the doors to the West and to Western media is a road which leads to our community.194

Founding of CAIR

According to District of Columbia corporate records, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) was first registered on September 15, 1994.195 Three individuals, all Palestinians,
have been identified as founders of CAIR, and all were employed by IAP: Omar Ahmad (IAP president, 1991-1994), Nihad Awad (IAP PR director, 1991-1994), and Rafiq Jaber, (IAP president, 1994-2005). According to Awad:

“After the Gulf War was over, I was offered a job with the IAP as their public relations director. Since many Americans had been exposed to only one side of the story, my responsibility was to explain the Palestinian experience to the public and the media. In this effort I worked closely with IAP president Omar Ahmad. Omar, however, had the insight to realize that the central issue facing the Muslim community in the United States was not being addressed. The core challenge—that of stereotyping and defamation—was having a devastating effect on our children and paralyzing adults from taking their due roles in civic affairs. Omar suggested to me that we leave the IAP and concentrate on combating anti-Muslim discrimination nationwide. He proposed that I move to Washington, D.C., where any effective national effort would have to be based, while he tried to raise the seed money for the project. I contacted my friend Ibrahim Hooper, a professional journalist and communications genius, and tried to persuade him to move to Washington and join the project. Omar’s vision and concern for Muslims in America coincided with Ibrahim’s and my desire to take up the task. Ibrahim and I had worked together for years to help our local community reach out to its neighbors and we understood that individual initiatives were essential, but that they would never be as effective as a coordinated national effort. So the three of us took a chance. We decided to try to bridge the chasm of ignorance between Muslims in America and their neighbors. We knew it was a simple prescription but one that would not be easy to apply. In June 1994 we used a modest donation as a starting budget to open the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in Washington, D.C.”

Awad fails to explain that startup funds for CAIR appear to have been provided by HLF. In 2003 Senate testimony, Awad categorically denied that CAIR received such funds, calling the accusation “an outright lie.” CAIR Chairman Ahmad also has denied receiving start-up funds from HLF. However, there is evidence of a wire transfer from HLF to CAIR dated October 31, 1994, well within the timeframe provided by Awad above.

From 1995 through 1996, CAIR participated in the defense of Hamas and U.S. Brotherhood leader Marzook in his legal difficulties with the U.S. government. Specific activities included: protesting Marzook’s arrest and extradition to Israel for conspiratorial activity; signing an open letter to then Secretary of State Warren Christopher that railed against “the injustice that has prevailed against Marzook” and alleged that “our judicial system has been kidnapped by Israeli interests;” including Marzook in its April 1996 allegations of religious persecution; and raising funds on Marzook’s behalf.
Fiqh Council of North America

The last major U.S. MB organization to be officially registered was the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), which had its origins in the MSA and ISNA. According to its current website, FCNA explains its origins as follows.205

The Fiqh Council of North America traces its origins back to the Religious Affairs Committee of the then MSA of the United States and Canada in the early 1960s. This Religious Affairs Committee evolved into the Fiqh Committee of ISNA after the [latter’s] founding in 1980. As the needs of the Muslim community and the complexity of the issues they faced grew, the Fiqh Council was transformed into the Fiqh Council of North America in 1986. The Council continues to be an affiliate of ISNA, advising and educating its members and officials on matters related to the application of sharia [Islamic law] in their individual and collective lives in the North American environment.206 207

State government documents indicate that FCNA was officially established as a non-profit Virginia corporation on June 15, 1994.208 The three initial trustees were al-Alwani, Barzinji, and Alamoudi. Al-Alwani was listed as the official incorporator, with a Herndon address of 555 Grove Street (this was also listed as the registered address for FCNA). The founding documents make clear that FCNA was directly related to IIIT and SAAR. First, al-Alwani was president of IIIT at the time of FCNA’s incorporation. Second, the registered address for FCNA was the same address used by the SAAR Foundation and its many affiliates, including IIIT. Finally, documents state that upon dissolution of the organization, FCNA assets should be distributed either to the Safa Trust, IIIT, or NAIT.

Ahmed Elkadi Replaced

Some time in 1995, the Chicago Tribune reported that Elkadi had been replaced as “President” of the U.S. MB. The Tribune investigation first explained that Elkadi had a series of problems in his medical practice that resulted in the revocation of his medical license in 1992:

First to go was the clinic. Elkadi had fallen behind on the bills, and by 1988 creditors had won thousands of dollars in judgments against him. To prevent a sheriff’s sale, the Islamic bank in Luxembourg took over the property, and eventually it was sold to a drug rehabilitation clinic. But Elkadi faced an even more serious professional problem: Florida regulators started disciplinary action against him for

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[ 39 ]
performing unnecessary surgeries at a Panama City hospital and for doing major operations, including a mastectomy, at his clinic without proper precautions, such as an adequate blood supply. Regulators determined that Elkadi had performed unneeded stomach surgery on nine patients. The Florida Board of Medicine concluded that Elkadi “exhibited a total lack of judgment” and was “not a competent physician.” The board revoked his license in 1992.\textsuperscript{209} \textsuperscript{210}

Following these difficulties, the \textit{Tribune} reported that Elkadi was removed from his position in circumstances that are not clear. However, Elkadi implied that, as of 2004, the “organization and its members” continue to exist:

By the mid-1990s, his problems deepened. Not only was he forced to close his now-overcrowded and dilapidated school because of financial difficulties, he learned that Brotherhood leaders wanted him out as president. It remains unclear why he lost his position. Current and former Brotherhood members say they do not know or that Elkadi simply was voted out of office. Elkadi and his wife say he was removed because he was not conservative enough. They say he had been pushing for women and other Islamic groups to be more involved in the Brotherhood, and some members did not like that. “For some members, it’s a very ingrown type of mentality,” Iman Elkadi says. “You work only among Muslims, don’t [interact with] non-Muslims, so that your work is limited to a small circle.” She says the Elkadis believed that “the message of Islam is for everybody.” Elkadi’s daughter says he took this and other rejections hard. Elkadi now says he is not angry about his ouster and still loves the organization and its members. “They are good people because they follow Islam,” he says.\textsuperscript{211}
Reacting to the release of the Holy Land Documents in June 2007, a Dallas newspaper cited unidentified “experts” to assert that there was essentially “no trace” of the MB in the U.S.:

In the U.S., the Brotherhood emerged as an immigrant student movement in the 1960s, but according to experts, there is no current discernible MB presence in the U.S. today, although most agree some of its adherents remain.

On the contrary, this report has demonstrated that, from the early 1960s until 1995, the U.S. Brotherhood constructed an elaborate covert as well as public organizational infrastructure. With a few exceptions, this infrastructure continues to function until this day. (See Appendix 2)

U.S. Muslim Brotherhood Leadership

Although Elkadi was removed in 1995 as the leader of the U.S. Brotherhood, as noted above he implied to the Chicago Tribune that the organization and its members continue to exist. Many members of the Brotherhood leadership from 1988 to 1991 continue to serve in leadership positions in Brotherhood organizations including: Badawi (MAS, ISNA, FCNA), al-Ghazali (ISNA), al-Hanooti (FCNA). Two members of the Cultural Society that was registered in Missouri in 1974—Shamma and Jaghlit—also continue to play important roles in Brotherhood groups.

Brotherhood Organizations

Almost all of the U.S. Brotherhood front organizations continue to operate and, to varying degrees, have achieved prominence and are often treated by government, the media, and others as representatives of the U.S. Muslim community. The Brotherhood organizations include:

1. Muslim Student Association (MSA)

The MSA has grown since 1963 into an organization that claims 250 chapters on university and college campuses throughout the United States and Canada. The current MSA President is Asma
Mirza, likely the daughter or other close relative of SAAR officer Yaqub Mirza. MSA maintains close ties with U.S. Brotherhood organizations such as ISNA and CAIR whose leaders, such as Badawi, are frequently invited to speak at MSA conferences.

2. *North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)*

Since its founding in 1973, NAIT has acquired title to a large number of on up to 25-30% all Islamic facilities in the U.S., with estimates ranging from 27 to 79%. The NAIT website states that it maintains a close relationship with ISNA:

> NAIT supports and provides services to ISNA, MSA, their affiliates, and other Islamic centers and institutions. The President of ISNA is also a member of the board of trustees of NAIT.

Bassam Osman, one of the three current NAIT trustees, was identified earlier as part of the Brotherhood leadership structure.

3. *The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)*

Since its inception in 1983, ISNA has grown to the point where it describes itself as “the largest and oldest umbrella organization for the estimated 6-8 million Muslims embracing over 300 community organizations and professional organizations in North America.” The organization is probably best known for its annual conference, which had an expected attendance of some 40,000 in 2005. All but one of the individuals listed on the ISNA founding documents remains active either in ISNA or in one of its affiliated organizations. Sayyed Saeed, the current ISNA secretary-general and founding member, has been an officer or employee of many U.S. MB organizations discussed in this report, including MSA, IIIT, IIIFSO, and AMSS. His oldest daughter, Afifa, is married to Sohaib Barzinji, likely a relative of Jamal Barzinji. ISNA maintains close relations with all other components of the U.S. MB.

4. *International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)*

Since its founding in 1985, IIIT has grown into an international organization, with fourteen affiliated offices in the U.S., Europe, Middle East, and Asia. Abu-Sulayman, al-Alwani, Barzinji, Totonji, and Anwar Ibrahim all continue to serve in leadership roles.

Shaykh al-Qaradawi is also part of the IIIT leadership, and is perhaps the most important leader of the global MB. IIIT was one of the many institutions that were raised by federal law enforcement in 2002 as part of an ongoing investigation into terrorist financing. However, the organi-
zation appears to have undergone a renaissance of late and enjoys close relationships with the U.S. State Department, which frequently sponsors international exchange visits with IIIT.229

5. Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR)

Since its founding in 1994, CAIR has grown into a large organization with a national budget of over $2 million. It describes itself as “the nation’s leading Muslim organization in the civil rights and advocacy arenas.”230 Omar Ahmad and Nihad Awad, two of its original founders, continue to serve as leaders in the organization. Also playing an important role in CAIR-Canada is Badawi, identified in 1991 as part of the U.S. Brotherhood Shura Council. CAIR maintains close relations with other U.S. Brotherhood organizations and, at least at one time, also had an advisory board. The last known members of this board were listed on a December 2001 CAIR webpage, and included a number of individuals associated with ISNA and/or the Brotherhood Shura Council. These included Badawi and, Musammil Siddiqi.231 CAIR has recently enjoyed good relations with the U.S. State Department and the FBI, so much so that the agencies have used CAIR to provide its agents with “sensitivity training.”

6. Muslim American Society (MAS)

Since its founding in 1993, MAS has grown into a national organization with over fifty local chapters.232 MAS distinguishes itself from other U.S. Brotherhood organization by the depth and breadth of its political activities. It has formed alliances with left and far-left U.S. groups, notably International ANSWER, and coordinates extensive electoral activities through its Freedom Foundation. Its most important national leaders are Dr. Essam Omeish—the original MAS President—and Mahdi Bray, who first worked for AMC.233 Badawi is also active in the organization.

7. Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA)

Unlike the other U.S. MB organization, FCNA has not achieved any particular degree of national prominence. Its most visible action was to issue a fatwa against terrorism in July 2005 that was signed by most of the other U.S. Brotherhood organizations.234 As recently as August 2005, FCNA has been receiving fees from Saturna Capital, in connection with its advisory role on matters related to Islamic mutual funds (i.e. the Amana Growth Fund and the Amana Income Funds).235 A 1985 economics journal reported that Amana was established by Barzinji.236 A 2001 Amana webpage lists NAIT chairman Basam Osman as one of the Amana trustees, and states “ISNA provides advice and other services to Saturna Capital Corporation regarding investments
by ISNA members in the Funds.”241 Prior to the 2002 U.S. government raids on SAFA, the website listed SAFA group figures Mirza and Barzinji as Amana trustees.242 The current FCNA website identifies several important ISNA leaders as members of the Executive Council in addition to Badawi.243

Zainab Alwani, likely the daughter of FCNA founder and IIT leader Taha al-Alwani, and U.S. MB leader Hanooti are FCNA council members.

8. No longer existing

Two of the original U.S. MB organizations have disappeared. SAAR Foundation was dissolved in December 2000 following law enforcement interest in the organization.244 However, the York Foundation and SAFA Trust—both components of SAAR—appear to continue their operations.245 The AMC largely disappeared following the conviction of Alamoudi on terrorist related offenses in 2004.246 247 Many of the political functions of the AMC are being performed by the MAS and the Muslim Public Affairs Council.

U.S. Brotherhood Structure

This report does not suggest that the U.S. MB is a monolithic entity directed from a central point. There are indications of multiple “power centers” within the Brotherhood, with the relationships among them not fully understood. However, this report has also demonstrated that the U.S. Brotherhood is far being a “loose network” or “people sharing a common ideology,” as some have suggested prior to the release of the documents examined here. A public example of the close relationship shared by all elements of the U.S. Brotherhood is a new organization known as Americans for Constructive Engagement (AMCE), whose mission statement is:

Fostering a constructive partnership between the U.S. Muslim Community and the U.S. Government that would enable Muslims to play a positive and patriotic role in the Global War on Terrorism; aligning expectations and goals so as to contribute the Muslim voice and influence to public and political debates and in forging approaches to domestic and foreign policy; charting specific courses of action and conducting specific projects that will establish and enhance informed mutual cooperation between the U.S. Muslim Community and the U.S. Government, enabling the U.S. to make the best use of the American Muslim community’s potential for building bridges between the United States and the global Muslim Community.248
The AMCE leadership includes many of the individuals and organizations discussed in this report and should be considered as another likely Brotherhood front organization.\textsuperscript{249}

It should also be noted that the headquarters and residence of many of the leaders of the U.S. Brotherhood organizations live relatively near one another in Northern Virginia. This includes MSA, IIIT, MAS, FCNA, and CAIR.
CONCLUSION:  
THE BROTHERHOOD RESPONSE

The U.S. MB and its supporters, particularly MAS, have reacted at various times to the release of the Chicago Tribune investigation and the Holy Land trial documents. This reaction can be characterized as an attempt at defensive action and comprises two strategies. The first strategy is to attack the sources of the accusations. The second is to deny ties with the MB.

Attacking Sources

Following the publication of the Chicago Tribune investigation based on Elkadi’s recollections, MAS leader Mahdi Bray attempted to discredit Elkadi by referring to an illness that he suffers:

He mentions a Chicago Tribune article that attempted to link MAS to Egypt’s MB, but failed to mention that in addition to the reporter’s inaccuracies, later investigations revealed that the primary source used for the article was Elkadi. We now know through affidavits and pending litigation that Elkadi suffers from dementia and that his cognitive faculties were seriously impaired when the Chicago Tribune interviewed him. In fact, his family members have issued a written statement to this effect in hopes of preventing unscrupulous reporters surreptitiously interviewing Elkadi.

However, despite Elkadi’s condition, public documents used in this report confirm the accuracy of the Tribune report and Elkadi’s statements, confirming both the accuracy and internal consistency of his life in the U.S. and the establishment of the aforementioned Cultural Society.

MAS leaders have also said “documents obtained by the Tribune are either outdated or inaccurate” but do not appear to have either identified the inaccuracies or produced and documents to the contrary.

After asserting that the U.S. Brotherhood no longer exists, a Dallas newspaper cited a U.S. academic who said it may be “irresponsible” to place too much emphasis on the Holy Land documents, asserting, without evidence, that they were written by those “affiliated with the most radical part of the MB.”
Peter Mandaville, an Islamic scholar and director of the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University, says that although the documents presented at the trial are important, it may be irresponsible to place too much emphasis on them. “Those documents have to be read as internal communications that on some levels have elements of boasting and bravado,” he said. “The writer wants to tell impressive tales about the work they’re doing. Remember, these guys are affiliated with the most radical part of the MB.”

However, the detailed nature of many of the Brotherhood documents, complete with phonebooks, spreadsheets, and lengthy work-plans make it unlikely that the information about Brotherhood structure is somehow unreliable.

**Denying Ties to the Muslim Brotherhood**

A strategy of denying connections to the MB began as part of the original 2004 *Tribune* article when MAS leader Shaker Elsayed issued a somewhat contradictory set of such denials, claiming that the MAS was not “Ikhwan” and at the same time “not your typical Ikhwan:”

Shaker Elsayed, a top MAS official, says the organization was founded by Brotherhood members but has evolved to include Muslims from various backgrounds and ideologies. “Ikhwan members founded MAS, but MAS went way beyond that point of conception,” he says. Now, he says, his group has no connection with the Brotherhood and disagrees with the international organization on many issues. But he says that MAS, like the Brotherhood, believes in the teachings of Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, which are “the closest reflection of how Islam should be in this life.” “I understand that some of our members may say, ‘Yes, we are Ikhwan,’” Elsayed says. But, he says, MAS is not administered from Egypt. He adds, “We are not your typical Ikhwan.”

Since that time, the media has repeatedly focused on MAS and its ties to the MB, probably as a result of the *Chicago Tribune* investigation. MAS leaders have repeatedly denied any connection to the MB, disavowing connections to the Egyptian organization rather than focusing on the U.S. Brotherhood infrastructure. In October 2005, Bray said MAS was formed to promote integration and to be “distinct” from the MB:

“We’re not the Muslim Brotherhood,” said Bray, who heads the society’s outreach arm. He said the group was formed in 1993 to help integrate Muslim
immigrants into the mainstream of American life and to be distinct from the Muslim Brotherhood. “We formed in 1993 to make it clear that we don’t take our marching orders from anyone overseas,” said Bray, a convert to Islam. “We have no connection to the Muslim Brotherhood.”255

In an August 2007 media interview, MAS leader Omeish once again denied any ties to the MB but generally confirms the organizational history presented in this report:

If you look at the history of the presence of Islamic activism in the US in the 1960s, a lot of the Muslim Brothers, who had been Muslim Brothers in their own countries, have come to the U.S., organized, [and] established student groups. Over the years [they] were contributing to the development of the infrastructure of the greater Muslim community. So in fact, they do have their impact on almost a whole slew of Islamic organizations which exist today.

Omeish went on to assert once more that, while the MAS grew out of the Brotherhood, there were no longer any ties. He also claimed there was some “carryover” from the Brotherhood—ideas of “tolerance, plurality, patriotism, and service to humanity.”

INGRAHAM: But Hamas and al-Qaeda is one of them right? [Crosstalk]

OMEISH: Those organizations that were impacted by some of that, the school of thought, in fact there was a presence for the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States at some point. And the MAS grew out from the need to be an American activist Muslim group. We said that we don’t have any ties to any international organizations, we have some of our members who did agree to continue along the mass group may have in fact been Muslim Brothers in their past, but they didn’t carry over that association once they had become members of the MAS. Most of our membership, or a great deal of it, are people who are born and raised in America, people who are here, they’ve never had any communications or contact with the Muslim Brothers, but as I said, there is some carry over. So, there is some, and I think if you look at the basis for the ideas that the Muslim Brothers advocate

INGRAHAM: Oh, Global Caliphate.

OMEISH: Tolerance, you know, plurality, accepting American pluralism in fact, love of one’s country, doing you know, service for humanity.256
In September 2007, following the release of the Holy Land documents, Omeish called the documents “full of abhorrent statements” and once again asserted that while the MAS grew out of the Brotherhood, it had transformed itself:

Esam Omeish, president of the Virginia-based MAS, says the documents introduced in the Holy Land trial are full of “abhorrent statements and are in direct conflict of the very principles of our Islam ... The Muslim community in America wishes to contribute positively to the continued success and greatness of our civilization,” Omeish said. “The ethics of tolerance and inclusion are the very tenets that MAS was based on from its inception ... MAS is not the Muslim Brotherhood.” The society “grew out of a history of Islamic activism in the U.S. when the Muslim Brotherhood once existed, but has a different intellectual paradigm and outlook.”257

Despite these repeated denials, a high-ranking Egyptian Brotherhood official told the Chicago Tribune: “I don’t want to say MAS is a [Brotherhood] entity. This causes some security inconveniences for them in a post-9/11 world.”

Have They Changed?

The question of whether or not the MAS or any other U.S. Brotherhood front organization has “ties” to the Egyptian MB has become somewhat irrelevant in a world where the Brotherhood has become a global network with nominal links to the Egyptian “mother organization.” As an Egyptian Brotherhood leader recently explained when asked about the “international Muslim Brotherhood:

There are entities that exist in many countries all over the world. These entities have the same ideology, principle and objectives but they work in different circumstances and different contexts. So, it is reasonable to have decentralization in action so that every entity works according to its circumstances and according to the problems it is facing and in their framework. This actually achieves two objectives: First, it adds flexibility to movement. Second, it focuses on action. Every entity in its own country can issue its own decision because it is more aware of the problems, circumstances and context in which they are working. However, there is some centralization in some issues. These entities can have dialogue when there is a common cause that faces Arabs or Muslims over their central issues like the Palestinian cause. At that time, all of them must cooperate for it. I want to confirm that while some see
that Palestine caused rifts among the Arabs, we see that this cause is the one for which all Arabs unite.\footnote{258}

More important is the claim made by the MAS, for example, to have gone “way beyond” the Egyptian Brotherhood, implying some form of reform and/or moderation on the part of the U.S. Brotherhood. There are many reasons to be suspicious of this and similar claims. First, almost all of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood organizations continue to exist in their original form, often led by their founders and/or family members. No attempt appears to have been made to “clean house” by bringing in new and untainted leadership. Second, no public attempt appears to have been made by any U.S. Brotherhood organization or leader to acknowledge the history of the Brotherhood in the U.S. Only disingenuous denials have been issued when damaging documents come to light such as those examined in this report. Finally, where detailed investigations have been made of U.S. Brotherhood organizations, they have revealed an extensive history of support for Islamic fundamentalism, anti-Semitism, and support for terrorism that has included ideological, financial, and legal support, particularly for Hamas and other Palestinian terror organizations. For example, many of the individuals and organizations identified in this report have either been convicted or named as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation Hamas terrorism financing case.\footnote{259} \footnote{260}

Given the stated intent of the U.S. MB to conduct an “organizational jihad” in order destroy the U.S. from within and the extensive Brotherhood infrastructure existing within the U.S., the burden of proof must shift to the Brotherhood to prove it is anything other than what it says it is. ■
APPENDIX I
Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in the U.S.

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<td>IIIT</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>IIC</td>
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[Imagine if they all march according to one plan!!!]
APPENDIX I

Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in the U.S.

__________ relationship established by documents cited in this report
--------------- relationship established by other research
NOTES

3. Akram, p. 5.
5. These are often referred to in the report as “internal” Brotherhood documents.
7. The commission was officially established on March 6, 1960. See Amtsgericht München, Registerakten VR 6256, Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V.; Bl. 3 and 6.
9. Ramadan also helped to found the Muslim World League in 1962.
16. The Italian intelligence document also says that Nada’s mother’s maiden name was Nemat Abu Saud, raising the possibility that Mahmoud Abu Saud and Yusuf Nada are related and that Ahmed Elkadi is related to Yusuf Nada by marriage.
17. Zeid al-Noman (a.k.a. Zaid Naman) was introduced as Masul or “official” of the Executive Office of the U.S. MB before a speech he gave in Missouri in the early 1980s on “The Brotherhood in America.”
19. Ibid. p. 3.
21. Corporate registrations of the Cultural Society will be discussed later in this report.

23. Other histories of the MSA say the founding meeting was held in 1963.


27. Al-Noman, p. 3.

28. Ibid. p.4.


33. The year is probably wrong, since Barzinji appears to have graduated in the UK in 1962.

34. Mintz and Farah.

35. Possibly aka Hani Sakr (Saker).

36. MSA of the U.S. & Canada.


41. Al-Talib “About the Author.”

42. Al-Noman p. 3.


45. It is not clear how these two sets of organizations are related to each other.


51. M. Basheer Ahmed et al., Muslim Contributions to World Civilization (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005), viii.

52. “Historical Background,” Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America, http://www.amss.org/WhoWeAre/HistoricalBackground.aspx.


58. Probably Bassem Osman (aka Bassem Othman).

59. Barzinji, Sakr, Shamma, and Altalib were all identified by the FBI as MB members in their home countries before coming to the U.S. See “North American Islamic Trust” http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/149.pdf.


62. The MSA advisor also confirms that those who created NAIT were the same individuals who created the other organizations discussed above: AMSE, AMSS, and IMA.


65. Monroe is 185 miles from Louisiana State, where Barzinji attended Louisiana State University from 1969 to 1974, and where he obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. in chemical engineering.

66. Research in City Directories provided by Ouachieu Parish, Library, West Monroe LA on June 5, 2008.

67. Research in City Directories provided by Springfield-Greene County Library, Springfield MO on June 6, 2008.


71. Missouri Secretary of State: https://www.sos.mo.gov/BusinessEntity/soskb/Corp.asp?id=443691


73. Language in the founding documents also provides for the management of funds and property.


77. al-Talib “About the Author.”


79. For Dr. Sulayman’s resume, see: USC-MSA Compendium of Muslim Texts, “Dr. ‘Abdul Hamid Ahmad Abu-Sulayman,” University of Southern California, http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/humanrelations/crisis_in_the_muslim_mind/author.html.


86. Ibid.

87. The other two Nada children were born in Silver Springs, Maryland.


92. Confidential document in possession of the author.


95. al-Noman, p. 4.

96. Ibid, p. 4.

97. Ibid p. 4.

98. Ibid p. 5.


104. al-Talib p. 6.


107. 2000 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. Principals Mar-Jac Processing Inc Duns Number: 00-328-2100 Antecedent Information.


115. An internal MB document says MAYA was formed in 1972 as the Muslim Kuwaiti Youth’s Association and that its work centered around the Muslim students coming to America from all Arab countries. It also said that MAYA developed significantly during the eighties and that the Ikhwan played a fundamental role in leading and directing it at the leadership and grassroots levels. See Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council, “Shura Council Report on the future of the Group,” http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/MBUS_History.pdf p. 4.

116. A 1991 internal Brotherhood document says that the MISG was founded in 1976 and centered on students from Malaysian and Southeast Asia. It also said that MISG conferences in 1990 were attended by 600 students and the groups held annual leadership conferences and camps in various regions. The Ikhwan were said to play a general role in directing the group. See Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council, “Shura Council Report on the future of the Group,” http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/MBUS_History.pdf p. 4.


120. It should be noted that, according to his resume, Dr. Sami al-Arian, a leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the U.S., also played a role in the founding of ISNA. “Who is Dr. Sami Al-Arian?,” Tampa Bay Coalition for Justice and Peace http://www.freesamialarian.com/bio.html.


125. Sami al-Arian, a convicted leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), has stated that he was also involved with founding of IAP. Ibid.

126. SAFA Group was the name given by U.S. prosecutors to SAAR, IIIT, and related entities.


128. Biheiri also said that, while he had “never heard of the Cultural Society,” he surmised it must refer to the Muslim Student Association.


132. Although the original documents are not available, a U.S. government agent testified that the document contained all the same names as officers except for Faruq. All but Ibrahim listed their addresses as WAMY in Saudi Arabia, and Ibrahim was listed as a WAMY trustee. See: David C. Kane, “Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention,” United States of America v. Soliman S. Biheiri (Case No. 03-365-A), August 14, 2003, http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usbiheiri81403knaff.pdf


143. “(Proposed Redacted) Affidavit In Support Of Application For Search Warrant (October 2003)” In The United States District Court For the Eastern District Of Virginia Alexandria Division In The Matter Of Searches Involving 555 Grove Street, Herndon, Virginia, And Related Locations.”

146. Dr. Mirza was a student in Pakistan in 1969, and therefore probably knew Dr. Totonji through IIFSO.
150. These seemingly circular offshore money flows are still under investigation in the U.S. in connection with possible financing of terrorism. The entire SAFA Group was raided by federal law enforcement in 2002.
152. The spreadsheet only identifies surnames. The individuals were identified by matching these surnames with known MB leaders.
157. al-Talib

168. Elkadi also sat on the Majlis Ash-Shura of ISNA.


171. Akef lived in Germany from 1984-1987, where he headed the Munich center of the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany. See: Ian Johnson, “The Beachhead: How a Mosque for Ex-Nazi became Center of Radical Islam.”


174. Ibid.


179. Another document adds the Office of Foreign Affairs, The Investment Committee, The Rehabilitation Committee, the Medical Committee and the Legal Committee.


183. Levitt, p. 150.

184. Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, Basman Elashi and Infocom Corporation Sentencing Press Release
http://www.usdoj.gov/usaos/txn/PressRel06/elashi_bayan_ghassan_basman_infocom_sent_pr.html/


186. Many of the fund-raising activities involved the Holy Land Foundation.
187. Levitt, p. 150.
194. Ibid p. 11.
198. IAP appears to have been dissolved in 2005.
200. Nihad Awad, “Muslim-Americans in Mainstream America.”
204. Ibid.

210. The bank which rescued the clinic was likely managed by his father-in-law (Abu-Saud) and identified earlier.

211. Ibid.


216. The Vice-President is Hajar Abdul-Rahim, who may be related to Cultural Society President and Treasurer Yahya Abdul-Rahim. Hajar was listed as a Regional Masul in the 1993 Brotherhood phonebook. Although she appears to have resided in Milwaukee, she is described as attending the University of Florida.


[ 62 ]
238. “MEED has reported on the prospects for Islamic banking in the US,” Middle East Economic Digest, no. 15, June 1985.
242. Ibid.
243. About Us: http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/AboutUs/tabid/175/Default.aspx,
247. A new AMC was reconstituted, but does not appear to be playing a role within the U.S. Brotherhood.
250. Dr. Elkadi suffers from Binswanger’s disease, a rare neurological disorder.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Steven Merley is an Investigative Researcher with almost 20 years of experience in the study of political extremism. Over the last years, he has concentrated solely on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe and the U.S. and his work has been sponsored by think tanks, foundations, and national media. Mr. Merley consults frequently with government/intelligence agencies, journalists, and others on issues relating to the Muslim Brotherhood. Mr. Merley is currently a Senior Analyst with the NEFA Foundation.

ABOUT THIS SERIES

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